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ABSTRACT
Like most other legal disputes, most cases brought under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) settle. But although IDEA, the federal law governing
special education, was enacted a generation ago, litigants still lack guidance how the
mechanisms of settlement should work, what the settlement agreement should look like,
and what to do if one side of the dispute fails to live up to its agreement. Settling an
IDEA case entails unique issues—and unique pitfalls—that make the topic even more
challenging than the settlement of other cases. IDEA has a mediation provision with
extensive requirements and a one-of-a-kind prehearing settlement device termed the
“resolution session.” Special education settlement agreements may be vulnerable to
attack on the ground that they undermine the purpose of IDEA. Jurisdiction under IDEA
for actions to enforce settlements is uncertain, and exhaustion defenses may bar the
actions. There is an administrative offer-of-settlement provision whose interpretation is
open to debate, and parents who prevail in special education disputes have an
entitlement to attorneys’ fees that may, or may not, apply when a case is settled.
This Article provides a comprehensive description of the law of settlement of
IDEA disputes. It delves into mediation and dispute resolution, discussing what can be
mediated and how. It notes the courts’ general practice of enforcing settlement
agreements as written, despite arguments that departures from settlement terms are
justified. It marshals the arguments and caselaw regarding jurisdiction to enforce
settlement agreements and the administrative exhaustion defense. It describes the offerof-settlement rule and discuss its interaction with the attorneys’ fees provision. It
considers attorneys’ fees for settlements, discussing the circumstances under which fees
might be available to parents in IDEA settlements. Although this Article is intended
primarily to be descriptive, it concludes with an evaluation that advances some steps for
reforming the law of IDEA case settlement: a clarification of federal jurisdiction, a
bypassing of exhaustion for civil actions enforcing settlements, and greater legislative
guidance as to what forms of settlement may support fees.
____________________
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INTRODUCTION

Like most other legal disputes, most cases brought under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act1 (IDEA) settle.2 But even though IDEA, the federal law
governing special education, has been around since the 1970s, litigants are still without
clear guidance how the mechanisms of settlement should work, what the settlement
agreement should look like, and what to do if one or the other side of the dispute fails to
live up to its agreement.3 Existing legal literature has largely neglected the law that
governs the settlement of IDEA cases. There are a number of useful articles describing
the statute’s dispute resolution processes,4 and some articles that contain valuable
discussions of the benefits and drawbacks of special education case mediation,5 but the
actual law controlling special education settlement remains an understudied field.
This should come as no surprise. For all the time and effort that practicing
lawyers devote to settling cases, the law of settlement occupies little of the legal

1

20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2009). For ease of reference in light of recent changes in many of the
statutory provisions cited in this Article, the West unofficial version of the United States Code will be cited
rather than the official version.
2
Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with
Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 353 & n.120 (2001) (citing data from New York
State). Regarding non-special education cases, see Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212-14 (1992)
(collecting and analyzing studies of civil case dispositions).
3
In the past five years, there have been four Supreme Court cases interpreting the statute, but none
concerning settlement. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (permitting claim for
tuition reimbursement for private schooling of child found ineligible for services by public school);
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (disallowing expert witness costs as part of attorneys’ fees for prevailing
parents); Schaffer v. Weast, 549 U.S. 49 (2005) (placing burden of proof at administrative hearing on party
challenging educational program).
4
E.g., Andrea F. Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Reauthorized Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) of 2004: Where Do Mediation Principles Fit in?, 7 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65 (2007); Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special Education
Disputes: Any Good Ideas?, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 137 (2005). Other sources are cited passim.
5
E.g., Steven S. Goldberg & Dixie Snow Huefner, Dispute Resolution in Special Education: An
Introduction to Litigation Alternatives, 99 EDUC. LAW REP. 703 (West 1995); Marchese, supra note 2, at
361-65. Additional sources are cited passim.
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literature6 and less of the law school curriculum. Students may be exposed to offers of
judgment7 in Civil Procedure, learn about consent decrees8 in Remedies, and absorb some
lessons about the limits of conduct connected with settlement in Professional
Responsibility.9 But the portion of the law school curriculum that deals most directly
with settlement focuses on skills: Courses such as Mediation or Negotiation Strategy are
designed more to initiate students in the techniques of reaching mutually advantageous
settlements than to train them in the legal framework that governs formation and

6

The most celebrated law review article about settlement does not pay attention to the law of settlement,
but rather to the social effects of settlement as a pervasive practice and the ideology behind support for
agreed solutions. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Nevertheless, there
are exceptions to the generalization in the text, notably the work of Professor Parness, see, e.g., Jeffrey A.
Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing Settlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REV. 33 (2003);
Jeffrey A. Parness, Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 U.
KAN. L. REV. 347 (2002), and that of Professor Korobkin, see, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, The Role of Law
in Settlement, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 254 (Michael L. Moffit & Robert C. Bordone
eds. 2005); Russell B. Korobkin, The Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 839 (2004).
7
See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (establishing offer-of-judgment procedure).
8
The Federal Rules do not treat consent decrees differently from other injunctions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65
(covering injunctions). Rule 23(e) covers settlements in class actions, a topic that students may study in a
second semester Civil Procedure or Complex Litigation course. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (covering
settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise of class actions). Rule 41(a)(1) covers stipulation for
voluntary dismissal, a typical mechanism for disposition of settled cases, particularly cases for damages.
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1).
9
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (requiring lawyer to defer to client’s decision
whether to settle); 1.8(g) (generally prohibiting aggregate settlements); 1.8(h) (generally forbidding
settlement of claim between lawyer and client in absence of independent representation for client); 5.6(b)
(generally prohibiting settlements that restrict lawyer’s right to practice); see also Evans v. Jeff. D. , 475
U.S. 717 (1986) (finding no barrier in professional ethics rules or federal law to defendants’ conditioning of
settlement on plaintiffs’ waiver of civil rights attorneys’ fees). There are a few other instances of coverage
of settlement in law school classes, but what is striking is how scarce and disjointed the coverage is.
Among the examples are the exclusion of evidence of compromise and offers to compromise, a topic that
receives perhaps half a class hour of coverage in Evidence, see generally FED. R. EVID. 408 (barring
compromises and offers to compromise); legal malpractice for settling too cheaply, which perhaps gets a
few minutes in Torts, see generally Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195
(Conn. 1994) (upholding action against attorney for inducing client to settle); and attorneys’ fees for
settlements and validity of release-dismissal agreements, which might receive a little class time in Civil
Rights or Federal Courts, see generally Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (forbidding fees award when suit induced legislative change that
mooted case); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding release-dismissal agreement).
Federal jurisdiction to enforce settlements might receive a mention in Civil Procedure or Federal Courts.
See generally Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (finding no enforcement
jurisdiction unless reserved).
© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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enforcement of a settlement in a civil case.10 It is a commonplace that settlements are
contracts, and are construed accordingly.11 But they are highly specialized contracts,
ones that the law treats in a particularized fashion that students learn little about in law
school.
Settling an IDEA case entails unique issues—and unique pitfalls—that make the
topic even more challenging than the settlement of other cases. IDEA has a statutory
mediation provision with extensive requirements and a one-of-a-kind prehearing
settlement device termed the “resolution session” with its own peculiar characteristics.
Special education settlement agreements may be vulnerable to attack on the ground that
they undermine the statutory purpose of IDEA. The jurisdiction under IDEA for actions
to enforce settlements is uncertain, and exhaustion defenses may, or may not, bar the
action. There is an administrative offer-of-settlement provision whose interpretation is
open to debate, and parents who prevail in special education disputes have an entitlement
to attorneys’ fees that may, or may not, apply when a case is settled.
This Article aims to provide a comprehensive description of the current law of
settlement for IDEA disputes. It will delve into the mediation and dispute resolution
processes, discussing what can be mediated and what rules apply. It will note the courts’
general practice of enforcing settlement agreements as written, despite arguments that
departures from settlement terms might be justified under the statute. It will marshal the
arguments and discuss the caselaw with regard to jurisdiction to enforce settlement
10

See, e.g., Katheryn M. Dutenhaver, Dispute Resolution and Its Purpose in the Curriculum of DePaul
University College of Law, 50 FLA. L. REV. 719 (1998) (describing dispute resolution curricula). See
generally LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (4th ed. 2009) (text for law
school courses on Dispute Resolution).
11
See Daniel Blegen, Oral Settlement Agreements: Just What Did I Agree to?, 55 J. MO. B. 95, 95 & n.2
(1999) (collecting Missouri authority); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 9 (1996). Settlement agreements as such receive scant attention in the
typical Contracts course, however.
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agreements and the administrative exhaustion defense. It will describe the offer-ofsettlement rule, make note of its operation, and discuss its interaction with the attorneys’
fees provision. It will take up attorneys’ fees for settlements, discussing the
circumstances under which fees might be available to parents who reach compromises in
IDEA cases. Although this Article is intended primarily to be descriptive, it will build an
evaluation from its descriptive sections and put forward some steps for reforming the law
of IDEA case settlement: a clarification of federal jurisdiction for special education
settlement enforcement, a bypassing of exhaustion for civil actions enforcing settlements,
and greater guidance as to what forms of settlement may support fees.
Section I of this Article is a brief introduction to the legal framework established
by IDEA for education of students with disabilities and resolution of disputes that arise
under the law. The Article then turns to the legal issues involved in settling special
education cases, discussing dispute resolution session and mediation in Section II.
Section III covers the broad topic of settlement enforcement, including how settlement
agreements should be interpreted as well as courts’ jurisdiction to enforce agreements and
the exhaustion defense. Section IV moves from that topic to offers of settlement and the
impact of offer-of-settlement practice on attorneys’ fees awards. Section V considers the
legal forms of settlement, asking when, if ever, the settlement may take a form such that
attorneys’ fees may be awarded to prevailing parents on the basis of the agreement.
Section VI discusses proposals for reforming the law of settlement with regard to
enforcement jurisdiction, the exhaustion defense, offers of settlement, and entitlement to
fees.

© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states that accept federal
special education funding to provide free, appropriate public education to all children
with disabilities within their jurisdiction.12 States and local school districts assume not
only the duty to provide an appropriate education to these children, but also the
obligation to furnish services related to education, such as transportation, physical and
occupational therapy, sign language interpretation, and so forth.13 Children with
disabilities must be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, in inclusive settings,
and supplementary aids and services must be furnished to avoid the need for removal of
children from regular classes.14
Under IDEA, parents of children with disabilities have rights to participate in the
creation of the written program that sets out the services to be delivered to their child.15
These rights include the ability to challenge the services or placement the school offers,
as well as other aspects of the provision or denial of education to the child, by demanding
an adversarial “due process” hearing; both the parents and the school district may appeal
the result of the hearing to court.16 The procedural mechanisms guarantee that the law is
enforced in each individual case and that decision making by schools is transparent.
These procedures were critical features of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, the statute that is now IDEA; they demonstrate a “congressional emphasis”

12

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(i) (West 2009) (authorizing appropriations).
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26) (West 2009) (defining “related services”).
14
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5) (West 2009).
15
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West 2009) (requiring opportunity for parental participation in devising
individualized education program).
16
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)-(i) (West 2009). The child remains in the existing placement during the pendency
of proceedings. § 1415(j). Attorneys’ fees are available to parents if they are successful. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(F). The law also provides rights to challenge long-term suspensions, expulsions, or other removals from
school imposed on children with disabilities. § 1415(k).

13

© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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on participation rights and procedural regularity.17 Two federal cases strongly influenced
Congress in its drafting of the law; both upheld procedural due process claims against
exclusion from public school without notice and the opportunity for an adversarial
hearing.18
When Congress enacted amendments to the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act in 1990, it renamed the law the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act.19 The original law20 was the result of years of effort to create a legally enforceable
personal entitlement to appropriate public schooling for all children who meet a disability
standard and need special education. Although some states and localities had been
educating children with disabilities and receiving limited federal special education
funding to support their efforts, at the time of the law’s passage 1.75 million children
with disabilities were excluded from public school and 2.5 million were in inadequate
programs.21

17

See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 476 U.S. 176, 206 (1982); see also id. at 205 (“Congress placed . . .
emphasis on compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at
every stage of the administrative process . . . .”).
18
Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children (P.A.R.C.) v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Supreme Court
commented on the importance of these cases to the formation of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192-93.
19
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). The term “handicapped” had become disfavored, and many
in the disabilities rights movement favored placing the noun “person” or “individual” first and the “with
disabilities” modifier later, in order to emphasize that a person with a disability is a human being rather
than a manifestation of an impairment. See Illinois Attorney General, Disability Rights: Manual of Style
for Depicting People with Disabilities, at http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.html (visited Aug. 7,
2009).
20
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
21
H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975). The special education law came into place against a background
of broader federal efforts to end discrimination against persons with disabilities. In 1973, Congress passed
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities by
recipients of federal funding. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2009). Since state educational agencies and local
school districts receive federal money, section 504 confers rights to nondiscrimination in education on
children who have disabilities. The coverage of section 504 and title II of the ADA is broader than that of
IDEA, and accordingly those nondiscrimination laws protect some children who do not meet the definition
of eligible children found in IDEA as well as those who do. For a discussion of numerous difficult
eligibility issues under IDEA, see Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83 (2009).
© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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President Bush signed the latest amendments to IDEA, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, on December 3, 2004.22 The Improvement Act
left the fundamentals of IDEA intact, but added requirements regarding highly qualified
teachers, student assessment, and the other features of the No Child Left Behind
initiative.23 It also permitted some federal special education funding to be used for
intervention services for children not yet determined to have a qualifying disability.24 It
changed eligibility determination rules for children with learning disabilities.25 Most
significantly for present purposes, it refined and expanded provisions introduced in 1997
to promote alternative dispute resolution, and thus produced the current mediation and
resolution session provisions described in the next section of this Article.
II. IDEA’S MEDIATION AND RESOLUTION SESSION REQUIREMENTS
Under the present terms of IDEA, mediation must be made available for all
matters, including those that occur before the filing of a due process hearing request.26
Basic rules with regard to mediation include the following: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must not be used to delay or deny a parent’s right to a hearing or any other rights; (3) it
must be conducted by a qualified, trained, and impartial mediator; (4) the state has to bear
the cost; (5) scheduling must be timely and convenient to the parties; (6) a written
agreement resolving the dispute that is reached at mediation must be signed by both the
In 1990, Congress passed title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which bars discrimination against
persons with disabilities by units of state and local government (again including state educational agencies
and local school districts), creating yet another remedy for disability discrimination in education. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 12131-12150 (West 2009).
22
Acts Approved by the President, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2936 (Dec. 13, 2004). See generally
Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA.
L. REV. 7 (2006) (describing and evaluating 2004 Amendments).
23
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(10)(B) (defining highly qualified teachers), 1412(a)(16) (governing
participation in assessments by children with disabilities) (West 2009).
24
§ 1413(f).
25
§ 1414(b)(6)(A).
26
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(1) (West 2009).
© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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parent and a representative of the school district who has binding authority, and is
enforceable in court; and (7) mediation discussions, even if an agreement is not reached,
are confidential and may not be used as evidence in a due process proceeding or civil
litigation.27 Parents involved in mediation must also be afforded an opportunity to meet
with a disinterested party from a parent training and information or community parent
resource center or an appropriate dispute resolution entity.28 The state has to maintain a
list of qualified mediators.29
About six years ago, special education mediation was the subject of a General
Accounting Office study.30 The study found that state officials have an extremely
positive view of the special education mediation process.31 Various other reports on
mediation are also highly favorable.32 A major advantage to mediation over litigation is
the possibility that when the parties to a dispute are together with a skilled mediator, they
will think of solutions to the dispute that meet their respective interests but may be
something other than what a hearing officer might order.33 Criticism of the current
system of special education mediation centers on power disparities between the school
27

20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) (West 2009). See generally Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement
Agreements: Contract Law Collides With Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33 (2001) (suggesting
balanced approach to disclosure of mediation communications).
28
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2)(B) (West 2009).
29
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2)(C) (West 2009).
30
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY
LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS (2003).
31
Id. at 18. The opinion may be related to the procedure’s cost-savings. The report noted that in one state,
the cost of using a mediator was about one-tenth that of using a hearing officer. Id. Another state had a
figure of one-ninth. See id.
32
E.g., Damon Huss, Comment, Balancing Acts: Dispute Resolution in U.S. and English Special Education
Law, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COM. L. REV. 347, 359 (2002) (“The mediation provision’s design, . . . nurtures
and protects positive relationships between parents and the educational authorities.”).
33
See Paul M. Secunda, Mediating the Special Education Front Lines in Mississippi, 76 UMKC L. REV.
823, 825-28 (2008) (discussing successful resolution of special education dispute for teen in adult prison);
see also Leonard L. Riskin, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 863, 869 (2008) (describing position that mediation permits “the parties to work together . .
. ; allow a focus on the parties’ real needs and interests, in addition to their legal claims; offer a flexible
process customized to fit the parties' situation, emotions, and interests; and encourage the development of a
range of creative and responsive outcomes.”).
© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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district and the parent, particularly when the parents cannot afford a lawyer.34 Some
evaluations are mixed or essentially neutral.35
The resolution session is to be used in due process cases in which mediation is
not, unless the parents and the school district agree in writing to waive the session and go
directly to hearing.36 This session is to be convened within fifteen days of the parent’s
demand for due process, and has to include the parent and relevant members of the IEP
team, including someone with decision-making authority from the school district.37 The
parents are to discuss their complaint and the facts behind it, and the school district is
given the opportunity to resolve the case.38 Unless the parent is accompanied by an
attorney, the attorney for the school district is barred.39 If agreement is reached, the
parties execute a legally binding document, which may be enforced in court; a party may,
however, void the settlement agreement within three business days of when the
agreement is signed.40 If the parties do not resolve the dispute within thirty days of the
receipt of the due process complaint, the applicable timelines for hearings and appeals
begin to run again.41

34

See Huss, supra note 32, at 361-62; see also Marchese, supra note 2, at 361-65.
Compare Grace E. D’Alo, Accountability in Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip ‘Twixt Vision
and Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 241-42 (2003) (reporting on basis of study of perceptions
among participants in special mediations in Pennsylvania that mediators were more successful in averting
due process hearings than in building relationships between parents and schools or accomplishing other
goals), with Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education
Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 60-61 (1997) (reporting on basis of study
of perceptions of fairness among participants in special education mediations in New Jersey, “Participants
in this study generally expressed only mild satisfaction with mediation and perceived it only as a modestly
fair procedure,” and further noting concerns about power imbalance when parents lacked attorney
representation).
36
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (West 2009).
37
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(II).
38
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
39
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(III).
40
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii).
41
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).
35
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Relatively little precedent exists on the specifics of the mediation and resolution
procedures, but one prominent decision, D.D. v. District of Columbia, fills out the
permissible content of the resolution session by stating that attorneys fees may be
discussed at the session if the parents or counsel believe in good faith that they have an
entitlement to fees for work done prior to the session.42 The magistrate judge report that
this opinion adopts, Davis v. District of Columbia, ruled the due process hearing officer
erred by dismissing the complaint on the ground that the defendants offered a settlement
in full satisfaction of parent’s complaint when the parent did not believe the complaint
had been resolved to her satisfaction.43 The magistrate judge opinion also held that the
defendants undermined the parent’s right to counsel by refusing to negotiate concerning
fees at the resolution session.44 Another case, Friendship Edison Public Charter School
Chamberlain Campus v. Smith, ruled that a hearing officer erred in failing to admit
testimonial and documentary evidence regarding a resolution session, finding that when
the evidence was proffered to show that a parent was responsible for delay in completion
of evaluations, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 was inapplicable and no other provision
required confidentiality.45 Davis made a similar determination regarding admissibility of
evidence about the resolution session.46
The 2002 Report of the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special
Education would have gone even further in promoting alternative dispute resolution than
establishing mediation and resolution session procedures. It proposed voluntary binding
42

470 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007)
No. 05-2176 PLF/DAR, 2006 WL 3917779, at *7-*8 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006).
44
Id. at *8-*9.
45
561 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008). Rule 408 bars the admissibility of evidence of offers of compromise
of the claim as well as (except in some criminal cases) conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim, or to impeach through a
prior inconsistent statement.
46
Davis, 2006 WL 3917779, at *6-*7.
43

© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.

12
arbitration, with arbitrators specially trained in conflict resolution.47 It is unclear that
presenting a case before an arbitrator would be any cheaper or quicker than presenting
one before a due process hearing officer. An arbitration process would presumably cut
off appeals, but as a matter of public policy that may not offer any advantage over a
hearing in which the parties retain appellate rights.48 In any case, the comprehensive
2004 reauthorization of IDEA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act, did not adopt the Commission’s proposal, although the House draft of the
Reauthorization bill included such a provision and the House Committee’s Report
commented favorably on it.49 The Senate’s version of the Reauthorization bill did not
include arbitration, and the House conferees agreed to recede.50
III. INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING SETTLEMENTS
Interpretation and enforcement of settlement agreements can present challenging
issues. Interpretation encompasses construction of the agreement itself, public policy
considerations with regard to specific terms, and special issues concerning settlement of
minors’ claims. Enforcement embraces issues of jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

47

PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL
EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 43-44 (2002).
48
See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New Idea, Getting Behind No Child
Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 16 (2004) (“Binding arbitration is
not really an appealing endeavor, and may well lead to a lose-lose situation between home and school.”).
But see Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195 EDUC. L. REP. 35, 38 (West
2005) (advocating “the arbitration model of a single-session hearing without judicial appeal with very
limited exceptions, the principal one being in cases that present major new legal issues”).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 113-14 (2003).
50
H.R. CONF. REP. 108-779, at 216 (2004).
© 2009 by Author. All rights reserved.
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A. INTERPRETATION OF SETTLEMENTS
In general, settlement agreements will be enforced precisely as written. For
example, in Stephen H. v. West Contra Costa County Unified School District Financing
Corp.,51 an action alleging that a child was struck by at least four different teacher aides
over a five-month period and otherwise physically and emotionally abused because of
outward manifestations of his learning disability, the court denied a motion to dismiss
claims asserted under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,52 the Americans with
Disabilities Act,53 IDEA, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, when the defendant’s motion relied on a settlement agreement
previously entered into by the parties. The agreement released the defendant from
liability for all educational claims, but it created an exception for potential claims arising
out of interactions with aides.54
As Stephen H. suggests, settlement agreements in special education disputes are
enforced under general principles of contract law. This in turn implies that enforcement
may be challenged on the grounds of public policy and unconscionability. Most courts,
however, have been unsympathetic to parents’ claims that the settlements to which they
agreed gave away too much, or that the parents were taken advantage of in the bargaining
process. D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of Education is a prominent case in which the
court refused to invalidate a settlement agreement despite an argument that the basic
protections that IDEA furnishes a child had been bargained away.55 In D.R., the parents
of a child with severe developmental disabilities placed him at a private residential school
51

No. C 06-06655 TEH, 2007 WL 1557482 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2009).
53
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12132 (West 2009) (title II).
54
Stephen H., 2007 WL 1557482 at *2.
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because of dissatisfaction with his progress at a program offered by the school district.56
While their dispute over school district funding for the private school was pending, the
parents and the district entered an agreement in which the district agreed to pay the costs
of the private school at a rate of $27,500 per year for one school year and that amount
plus 90% of any increase the next year, and the parents agreed that the district would be
absolved of any other costs for the placement, related services, or transportation.57 The
next year, the tuition increased dramatically and the private school added a charge for
services of two aides.58 The school district refused to pay any portion of the cost of the
aides, contending that the aides’ services were a related service that they had not agreed
to pay for under the agreement.59 The district court ruled that the aides were
educationally necessary, so the district had to fund them; it reasoned that the settlement
was void because the child’s circumstances had changed. The court of appeals, however,
reversed, ruling that the child’s circumstances did not change, but rather the only change
was that the private school concluded that more help was needed to deal with the child’s
unchanged condition.60 The court refused to void the settlement despite the argument of
the dissent that enforcing a settlement in which the parents and the school district
bargained away a child’s fundamental rights undermines the public policy underlying
IDEA.61 The majority reasoned that permitting a party to void an “unpalatable”
agreement would be contrary to the broad federal policy of encouraging settlement.62

56

D.R., 109 F.3d at 898.
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One court distinguished D.R., noting that D.R. did not consider the situation in
which the child’s circumstances in fact had changed.63 In that case, E.D. v. Enterprise
City Board of Education, the court enforced a settlement agreement in principal part,
though it considered with regard to each breach of the agreement whether the school
district had deprived the child of free, appropriate public education by noncompliance.64
A Connecticut court dismissed an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment
brought by a school district after parents violated a settlement agreement by requesting a
due process hearing before the expiration of the time period set in the agreement. The
court found the barrier to seeking due process to be void as against public policy, and
held there was no unjust enrichment in the parents keeping $19,000 in settlement
proceeds because the amount represented a valid settlement for claims for reimbursement
of tuition for the previous school year.65
Considerations other than public policy may come into play when the law requires
judicial approval of a settlement, as with the settlement of purely monetary claim
involving a minor child plaintiff. In a proceeding to approve a minor-child settlement of
a court case involving claims under IDEA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
other laws, a court rejected an uncontested motion to enter an approval and dismiss the
case.66 Applying state law best-interests-of-the-child standards, the court ruled that the
proponents of the settlement had failed to provide adequate information about the
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E.D. v. Enterprise City Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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condition of the child, the adequacy of the monetary settlement, or the reasonableness of
the attorneys’ fees portion for the court to enter approval at that time.67
B. ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS
There are questions about courts’ jurisdiction to enforce settlements, and whether
settlements can be enforced directly in court, or whether parental claims that the school
district failed to obey a settlement must be administratively exhausted. The 2004 IDEA
Amendments established that settlements reached either at mediation or the resolution
session are enforceable in federal district court or state court.68 The absence of any
mention of an exhaustion requirement implies that if the opposing party violates a
settlement agreement reached at either of these two sorts of meetings, direct enforcement
will be available, and exhaustion through a due process hearing will not be necessary.
Nevertheless, some courts have required exhaustion for enforcement even of
settlements reached at mediation or the resolution session. In R.K. v. Hayward Unified
School District, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of the parties’ rights and
obligations under a settlement agreement reached at mediation that called for the child to
be placed at a private school.69 Plaintiff alleged that the school district failed to comply
with the settlement by not facilitating necessary meetings and not permitting the parents’
expert to attend meetings that did occur; by the time of the litigation, the private school
had discharged the child and the child was out of school entirely.70 The court found
jurisdiction for the action to enforce the agreement pursuant to the new IDEA provision
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Id. at 592.
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(affirming denial of restraining order).
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as well as on the ground that a claim concerning an IDEA settlement agreement arises
under federal law, but it dismissed the case on the ground that exhaustion was required.71
Relying primarily on cases involving settlements not reached at mediation, the court
reasoned that the presence of jurisdiction did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement
generally applicable to IDEA disputes, and further stated that the case would benefit from
development of the record at an administrative hearing.72 In another case, Pedraza v.
Alameda Unified School District, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction over a dispute
regarding an alleged failure to provide services and reimbursement agreed upon in a
settlement reached at mediation, when parents contended that the failure resulted in
denial of an appropriate education.73 The court found that the exhaustion requirement
applied to settlements reached at mediation, but ruled that in the particular case
exhaustion would be excused on the ground that it was futile.74 The court relied on the
fact that a complaint filed with the state education department had failed to produce
enforcement.75 Courts have also dismissed actions based on breaches of settlement
agreements reached outside of mediation or the resolution session, typically citing lack of
jurisdiction or failure to exhaust.76
Cases such as E.D. and School Board v. M.C.77 point in the opposite direction,
however. The M.C. court said that due process hearing officer jurisdiction may not exist
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for enforcement of settlement agreements and suggested the existence of jurisdiction in
the state trial courts.78 In E.D., the federal court directly enforced key provisions of a
settlement agreement, though it considered with regard to each breach of the agreement
whether the school district had deprived the child of free, appropriate public education by
noncompliance.79 An additional court ruled that a settlement agreement embodied in an
individualized educational program (IEP) may be enforced directly in court without
exhaustion, relying on legislative history and precedent establishing that failures to
provide services listed on an IEP are matters that can be brought directly to the
judiciary.80 Still another court applied 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a remedy for violation of
IDEA and entered a $10,000 damages judgment when a school district failed to provide
compensatory education in accordance with agreements that it made in settling a due
process proceeding.81
IV. IDEA’S OFFER-OF-SETTLEMENT RULE
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), if parents reject a written offer of settlement
that is as favorable as or more favorable than what they obtain at hearing, fees accrued
after the offer was received may not be awarded to them, though there is an exception if
the parents prevail and were substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.82
This provision is an administrative version of the rule that applies to civil disputes in the
federal courts, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, and is similarly designed to promote
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settlement. The offer must be made more than ten days before the due process hearing
begins and may be accepted within ten days.83
Students of economics question the effectiveness of rules like Rule 68, which
provide only one side of the dispute (the claimant) an incentive to settle. They submit
that the rules bias offers downward but leave the probabilities of settlement unchanged.84
Professor Miller posits that parties to disputes base their settlement postures on what they
perceive as the likely outcome of continuing to litigate the hearing or court case.85 For
the person bringing the case, the settlement demand is the expected recovery, discounted
by the probability of losing and getting nothing at all, minus unrecovered litigation costs.
For the respondent, it is the same amount plus litigation costs, although disputants
frequently do not see eye-to-eye on what those numbers are.86 A provision such as Rule
68 or the offer-of-settlement provision in IDEA, which reduces the recovery that the
parent is likely to receive (if the offer is rejected, the fees recovery goes down), creates an
incentive for the parents to decrease the amount of monetary and other relief they
demand.87 But school districts perceive the same likelihood of reduction in the expected
recovery by the parents, and can be expected to decrease their offers commensurately.88
The parties’ settlement figures are thus likely to stay as far apart from each other as they
would be if no such rule existed; demand and offer will simply both be at a lower amount
than if there were no rule. As Miller points out, the problem could be solved by creating
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§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I).
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an incentive for both the claimant and respondent to settle, as by imposing extra fees on
respondent if a claimant’s demand is rejected and the claimant recovers more than the
demand.89 No proposal of this type has emerged since creation of the offer-of-settlement
rule, however, and none was never on the table during the recent reauthorization of
IDEA.
Courts have generally been sensitive to the fact that parents may view some offers
from school districts as less favorable than the relief finally obtained, even though the
offer may look more attractive from other perspectives.90 Recent cases along these lines
include Benito M. v. Board of Education, holding that the outcome of the due process
hearing was more favorable than the offer of judgment when the settlement offer
included a day school placement with transportation for two years, an assistive
technology evaluation with an IEP meeting to follow to consider the evaluation results,
and a future IEP meeting to implement a change in placement, but the hearing officer
ordered a placement of indefinite duration at the specific school where the parent had
placed the child and mandated weekly thirty-minute compensatory speech-language
services for the school year.91 A similar case is B.R. v. Lake Placid School District,
awarding a parent $18,874 in attorneys’ fees upon finding the consent decree that
resolved the case more favorable than the defendant’s offer of settlement in that it gave
the parent more input on the selection of an expert evaluator and greater specificity with
regard to the length of the school day, the exact number of compensatory education
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sessions, methods of interaction with peers, and the permissible use of physical
restraint.92
The rules concerning mediation may interact in unpredictable ways with the rules
regarding offer of settlement. In J.D. v. Kanawha County Board of Education, the court
refused to consider whether the written offer of settlement could provide the basis for
limiting the parents’ attorneys’ fees, reasoning that the offer referred to mediation
discussions by offering to settle “on the terms and conditions set forth in the settlement
agreement reached but not signed at the mediation session.”93 Since mediation
discussions are confidential, the school district could not introduce an agreement reached
but not signed at mediation, and thus had no way to sustain its claim that the litigated
outcome was no more favorable than the offer.94
Inclusion or exclusion of attorneys fees may be an issue in making the
determination whether a litigated result is more favorable. In Hawkins v. Berkeley
Unified School District, the court declared a parent substantially justified in rejecting a
settlement offer including only $500 in fees when the parent’s attorneys had already
incurred $9,000 in fees.95 By contrast, in Olivas v. Cincinnati Public Schools, the court
ruled that a settlement that was exactly what hearing officer eventually ordered with
respect to services for the child but included only $1000 in attorneys’ fees barred
recovery of fees incurred after the offer.96
Finally, it must be noted that although the statutory rule is an analogue to Rule 68,
the analogy is less than perfect, and the differences may create a problem. A Rule 68
92
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offer is an offer of judgment. A judgment is a judicial action, enforceable by ordinary
processes of execution, ultimately backed by the contempt sanction. A settlement under
§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) does not have the character of a judgment, and, as noted, there are
serious issues about settlements’ enforceability. For this reason, it is doubtful whether a
settlement is ever as good as or better than a due process hearing decision affording relief
to the claimants. Although even a decision in a fully litigated due process case is not a
judicial judgment of the type Rule 68 contemplates, it is an final order, and under the
leading case, Robinson v. Pinderhughes, it may be enforced in court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 without further administrative exhaustion.97 It is thus a far more valuable
item than any private settlement.
V. FORM OF SETTLEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES REQUESTS
In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources, the Supreme Court held that under the attorneys’ fees provisions
relevant to that case, settlements do not entitle parents to fees unless the settlements have
a “judicial imprimatur,” something that is true for judicial consent decrees but not for
ordinary private settlements of lawsuits.98 The previous approach, termed the “catalyst
theory,” permitted an award of fees when the filing of the case was a catalyst for
voluntary change on the part of the defendant.99 Courts have all but universally applied
Buckhannon’s abolition of the catalyst rule to the provision of IDEA governing the award
of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parents.100
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Questions, however, remain about how to apply the Buckhannon rule to special
education disputes. Hearing officers do not ordinarily enter orders termed “consent
decrees” in special education cases. The issue thus becomes what forms of hearing
officer action will be considered sufficiently analogous to the entry of a consent decree to
qualify a prevailing parent for fees, when the settlement itself does not include a fees
award. Several courts have determined that fees may be awarded on the basis of the
entry at hearing of an agreed order,101 and when an agreement was read into the record in
front of a hearing officer.102 The leading case is A.R. v. N.Y. City Board of Education,
which affirmed an award of fees when hearing officers placed the words “so ordered” on
settlement agreements.103 In V.M. v. Brookland School District, the court awarded fees
on the basis of a negotiated settlement agreement presented to the hearing officer as a
consent order and incorporated into the hearing officer’s decision.104 By contrast,
ordinary private settlements have been held not to support applications for fee awards
because of Buckhannon.105
A related issue is when the parent can use the right of appeal to challenge a
hearing officer’s refusal to memorialize a settlement in a form which has the hearing
officer’s imprimatur. In Traverse Bay Area Intermediate School District v. Michigan
Department of Education, the court held that when the parties reached a settlement
agreement pursuant to an offer of judgment and the parents’ counsel indicated an
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intention to file a motion having the hearing officer review the settlement and incorporate
it into an order of dismissal, but the hearing officer refused, the state review officer then
lacked authority to enter the agreement as a consent order incorporating terms of
settlement over objection of school district.106 The court, however, awarded the parent
fees on the basis of the school district’s unsuccessful effort to enforce settlement
agreement provisions against the parent.107 Similarly, in Wright v. District of Columbia,
the court denied fees when, although the parties agreed during the hearing that the district
would conduct a psychosocial evaluation for the child and convene a multi-disciplinary
team and student evaluation plan meeting, the hearing officer issued an order stating that
the matter was settled without a prevailing party.108 Nevertheless, a case is not made
moot when the defendant offers full relief on the merits in a private settlement that does
not carry a judicial imprimatur and so lacks the enforceability of a settlement that has
judicial approval.109 Judicial imprimatur may come in the form of a retention of
jurisdiction after settlement, even a retention of jurisdiction over the fees issue. Applying
Ninth Circuit authority, a court has ruled that retention of jurisdiction to resolve the issue
of attorneys’ fees is itself sufficient judicial imprimatur to support the entry of a fees
award.110
VI. EVALUATION: IMPROVING THE LAW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION SETTLEMENT
At this point, there seems little justification for further tinkering with the
mechanics of the IDEA mediation and resolution session. Similarly, although one can
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quarrel with the results in any given case, it seems sensible as a general matter to enforce
settlement agreements as written but leave the door slightly ajar for defenses to
enforcement based on public policy, unconscionability, or unforeseeable changes of
circumstances.
The jurisdiction and exhaustion problems with enforcing settlement agreements
are a different matter. Whether there is federal jurisdiction to enforce a private
settlement—essentially a contract—that resolves a claim under a federal statute and
ought to be interpreted consistently with the purposes of the federal law, raises the classic
question of what constitutes federal question jurisdiction when the federal statute does
not create the cause of action asserted in the case.111 Establishing federal jurisdiction for
actions to enforce special education settlements would certainly encourage parties to
settle by insuring that a tribunal with expertise in the federal special education law will
stand ready to make the settlement stick if that is what the law requires. But unless one
finds an implied cause of action under the statute or can rely on a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of IDEA,112 the legal basis for the jurisdiction is
111

Compare American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916) (finding no
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shallow.113 An amendment to IDEA to create the jurisdiction would appear to be in
order, just as Congress established jurisdiction for actions to enforce settlements reached
at mediation or the resolution session.114
If jurisdiction exists for settlement enforcement claims, as it undeniably does for
settlements reached at mediation and the resolution session, there is no justification to
impose an exhaustion requirement. An exhaustion requirement puts the aggrieved party
literally back at square one, having to litigate the case that was supposed to have been
resolved; that remains true even if the hearing officer is willing to transform the claim
into one over the breach of the agreement itself, which it appears that not all hearing
officers are willing to do or courts willing to require.115 Actions to enforce special
education settlement agreements need not be burdensome to the courts. By and large,
they will hinge on the straightforward question whether the parties have or have not
complied with the letter of the agreement. Far more costly in terms of judicial and
administrative economy is the uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of settlements.
It is difficult to be enthusiastic about the operation of the offer-of-settlement rule.
There is no reason to believe that it actually promotes settlement, and special education
cases—complex disputes that typically involve ongoing placements and services,

cases that reject the § 1983 cause of action are damages actions, and some of the same circuits that do not
allow damages actions allow actions for injunctive relief, at least in some range of circumstances. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987).
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compensatory programs, evaluations, behavior programs, and many other things in
addition to cash awards—seem ill-suited to evaluations of whether an offer is or is not
superior to a litigated result. The outcomes in the cases appear to manifest a judicial
reluctance to second-guess claimants who reject settlements.116 Adoption of a two-way
offer-of-settlement rule seems unlikely. In the absence of a movement to repeal the
offer-of-settlement provision, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is the continued
interpretation of the rule in the way that most courts have done. On the specific issue of
inclusion or non-inclusion of fees in offers of settlement, it is harsh and nonsensical to
view a settlement offer as equally favorable to claimants when it contains no fees or an
unrealistically low amount of fees and the litigated outcome contains the same relief but
will support a full fees award if such a claim is asserted in a subsequent civil action.
Holdings that run in the opposite direction should be rejected.117
Congressional action may be necessary to clear up the ambiguities created by the
application of Buckhannon to special education cases. Expressly permitting hearing
officers to enter consent decrees would be one possibility. If jurisdiction to enforce
settlements is not provided to courts, it would help if Congress at least clarified when a
hearing officer may or must retain jurisdiction to enforce an agreed disposition, and
clarity on that issue would in turn promote clarity on the fees issue by dividing
settlements into those that are like consent decrees (when jurisdiction is enforce is
retained) and those that are not (when no jurisdiction to enforce exists).
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CONCLUSION
The description of the law of special education settlement provided above
illustrates, if nothing else, the complexity of the issues involved. The suggestions
advanced above are hardly radical in nature, but they may make it easier for parties in
special education cases and their advocates to sleep at night, less worried whether
settlements will stick or what to do if they do not.
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